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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ST. BENEDICT'S HOSPITAL, 
Plaintiff, 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, and CAROL PETERSEN, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
No. 18120 
This is an original proceeding brought before this 
Court to review the decision of the Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission concerning a claim for unemployment 
compensation by defendant Carol Petersen. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE COMMISSION 
After unemployment compensation was initially denied 
by the Utah Department of Employment Security, a hearing 
was held before an appeals referee. The referee affirrn~d 
the denial of compensation based upon the finding that 
defendant Carol Petersen had voluntarily terminated her 
employment without good cause. The decision of the referee 
was appealed to the Board of Review which reversed the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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previous finding and held that Carol Petersen was entitled 
to unemployment compensation. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decision rendered by 
the Board of Review and restitution of any amounts debited 
to Plaintiff's reserve account for the use and benefit of 
defendant Carol Petersen. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this controversy are relatively simple as 
evidenced by the small record filed in this matter. In 
order to simplify the existing record, however, Plaintiff 
will describe the chronological events occurring after 
defendant Carol Petersen's termination from St. Benedict's 
Hospital and will describe the circumstances of the termination 
as part of the proceedings during the appeal's referee hearing. 
On July 8, 1981 Carol Petersen applied with the Utah 
Department of Employment Security for unemployment benefits. 
(R. 41). Shortly thereafter, a form was sent to St. Benedict's 
Hospital stating that Mrs. Petersen had given the reason for 
separation as "quit to accept other employment." The Hospital 
replied that the reason for unemployment was "voluntarv 
.... 
resignation to stay home with family." (R. 40). 
Petersen filed a form entitled "Claimant's Statement 
on Voluntary Quit" and stated that the main reason she left 
-2-
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work was "informed employer that I would be leaving later 
in the year--told to quit now." (Emphasis added). She 
further stated that she had interviewed with Hill Air Force 
Base and had a verbal promise of employment and was waiting 
for an opening. She stated she had no intention of leaving 
then. (R. 39). The examiner disqualified Mrs. Petersen 
from unemployment compensation on the grounds t?at she quit 
without good cause because of personal reasons. "Claimant's 
actions caused her to become unemployed." (R. 39). 
In reaching this decision the examiner had interviewed 
Joe Featherston, the hospital's administrative supervisor, 
who stated that Petersen had gone to her im.~ediate supervisor 
and told her she would be quitting in order to stay home 
with her family. She was told she would have to give thirty 
days notice and at the end of the thirty days she quit. 
Featherston told the examiner "nothing was mentioned of the 
claimant looking for other work." (R. 38). 
Petersen was notified of this decision (R. 37) and 
shortly thereafter filed an appeal from the decision of the 
representative. She stated in her written statement that 
she left because of severe harrassrnent by her supervisor 
who she believed wanted to hire another nurse in her place. 
She wrote "I decided I could no longer stand untrue and 
highly emotional accusations of what a bad person I was." 
-3-
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She further stated that she was forced out of her position 
and that she believed she was entitled to compensation 
until she could find further work either in patient educa-
tion or inservice. (R. 35-36). 
On August 7 a notice was sent to Petersen that a 
hearing would be held on August 17 before the appeals section 
of the Department of Employment Security to determine whether 
the claimant was able to work and was available for work, 
whether the claimant voluntarily left work without good 
cause, and whether the claimant was discharged for an act 
or omission in connection with employment. (R. 34). 
On August 18 the appeals referee entered findings that 
the claimant Carol Petersen had failed to appear for the 
hearing and therefore affirmed the determination of the 
department representative that she was not entitled to com-
pensation since she had left work voluntarily without good 
cause. (R. 33). 
On August 24 a "Notice to Appeals Section" was received 
in which it was stated by defendant Carol Petersen that she 
had been out of town when the notice to appear had arrived 
and did not return until after the hearing had been held. 
She requested a further hearing which was granted by the 
appeals referee for September 1, 1981. (R. 31-32). 
On September 1, 1981 a hearing was held before Jerold E. 
-4-
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Luker, the appeals referee, with the claimant Carol Petersen 
testifying on her behalf and Joe Featherston testifying on 
behalf of St. Benedict's Hospital. A copy of this transcript 
is contained in the record. (R. 19-29). Briefly, Petersen 
stated that she was not working at the time of the hearing 
but had taught a class at Hill Air Force Base for a short 
period of time for a set fee of $100.00. (R. 19-20). Prior 
to this she stated she had worked at St. Benedict's Hospital 
in orientation and patient teaching which included instructing 
new nurses that are hired at the hospital and also giving 
patients instruction on such things as diabetic treatment 
and pacemaker caree She noted that she was a registered 
nurse with a B.S~ degree. (R. 19-20). 
Petersen stated that the reason she quit was that 
she had felt harrassed from her supervisor. She stated 
that this "harrassment" had been going on for a couple of 
months and that she finally went to Mr. Featherston to 
speak with him concerning it. Petersen told Featherston 
that her supervisor kept informing her that she was not pro-
ducing, was not doing her job, and always spoke with her at 
inappropriate times. 
Petersen testified that at the meeting Mr. Featherston 
stated that he could see there was bad chemistry going on 
and it was decided by both of them that she should take a 
-5-
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leave of absence. She testified she did not want to quit 
St. Benedict's and had no intentions of ever quitting but, 
on the other hand, she said she could not stay in the 
environment because she was becoming physically ill. She -
admitted she had not sought a doctor's advice concerning 
her working conditions but diagnosed the problem herself 
since she was a nurse. (R. 23) . Petersen proposed that. her 
leave of absence should run two or three months until she 
could get her self-esteem back together. She had no inten-
tion to work elsewhere during that period of time. 
She stated that there were other positions in the 
hospital that could use her training and experience but 
that she was denied a request for transfer. She wanted to 
transfer into a coronary care unit where she had previous 
training. Her employer denied this request but offered her 
to be a staff nurse in an unfamiliar area. 
She related that she did not try to find any employment 
at the South Davis Hopsital and that she had learned from a 
friend in mid-May there was nothing available at the ~~Kay­
Dee Hospital. (R. 23). 
After.talking to Mr. Featherston, Carol Petersen stated 
she went to see Pat Brown, Director of Nursing. Brown told 
her that she could not take a leave of absence. and could not 
work in the coronary care unit. She said she could still 
-6-
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work at the hospital in other areas but Petersen felt these 
areas were not in her field of expertise. 
Petersen stated that she asked Mr. Featherston what 
she needed to do in order to leave. He told her she would 
have to write a letter of resignation. Petersen stated 
that her supervisor typed out a little statement which said 
she would be leaving June 30 and "made me sign it." (R. 24). 
Petersen testified that she was really sorry she signed 
it and that she should not have been pressured into it. 
She did not go over her supervisor's head to try to obtain 
an extra month since she just "gave up." She stated that 
she believed her supervisor made her sign the paper in 
order that she (Petersen) would be gone by June 30 since 
another girl would be coming in on July 1 who her supervisor 
wanted in Petersen's job. Petersen explained that she thought 
the sole purpose in pressuring her was to allow this other 
girl to begin work on July 1 since the new girl's husband 
had just started work at another hospital and they both 
wanted to begin at the same time. (R. 25). 
Joe Featherston testified on behalf of the employe~ 
St. Benedict's Hopsital. Mr. Featherston stated he was 
St. Benedict's Director of Human Resources and Support 
Services. He related that he was not Petersen's immediate 
supervisor but was the administrative person over that area. 
-7-
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Mr. Featherston recalled that Carol Petersen had come 
to him and told him she felt harrassed. Because of Mr. 
Featherston's prior discussions with Petersen's supervisor, 
he knew there had been attempts to try to get Petersen to 
come up to standard in a number of areas including absenteeism. 
He stated that Carol Petersen would plan trips without 
getting prior approval from her supervisor and that her 
general performance level was not up to what it should have 
been. He stated that her supervisor was attempting to 
counsel her to get her up to a performance and attendance 
standard that could be accepted. (R. 26). 
During the conversation Mr. Featherston testified that 
Petersen stated her supervisor had been harrassing her and 
that there seemed to be no way to please her. Mr. Featherston 
stated, "She seemed to be at a point where she was willing to 
just chuck it and quit." Featherston suggested that she 
should transfer to another area and arranged for an inter-
view with Pat Brown, Director of Nursing. 
Petersen was not placed in the coronary care unit 
since her best friend was the head nurse of that unit and 
the administration felt that it would not be a healthy 
relationship for either of them. Mr. Featherston stated 
"it would put undue pressure on the head nurse for that ty·pe 
of relationship and it wouldn't be healthy for Carol either." 
-8-
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Petersen was offered a night position but she did not 
accept it. After her conversation with Pat Brown, Petersen 
came back to Mro Featherston and said "I'm going to quit." 
She told Mr. Featherston that she had talked to her super-
visor and told her she would be available through July but 
Mr. Featherston related that the hospital policies required 
only thirty days notice and that it would be in the best 
interests of everyone to only have thirty more days of work 
rather than sixty. (R. 25). Had Petersen told him that 
she wished to work through July it possibly could have been 
arranged. 
During the thirty-day period Petersen again talked to 
Mr. Featherston and told him she was surprised that she 
only had thirty days left. Mr. Featherston explained to 
Petersen that the hospital policy was thirty days in order 
to allow a new person to fill the position. 
Mr. Featherston testified that the hospital had a policy 
and procedure for harrassment and that each employee received 
a manual describing the formal grievance procedure. (R. 27). 
He recalled that Petersen never utilized this procedure in 
complaining about the harrassment. Featherston also denied 
that Petersen had been pushed out for the purpose of making 
room for another person since the hospital did not begin 
its search until after she gave the hospital her notice of 
-9-
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her intention to terminate employment. The search was 
both internal and external and it took some time before the 
proper candidate was found. 
On rebuttal Petersen admitted that there was a grievance 
policy procedure at the hospital but did not follow it because 
she thought complaining to Mr. Featherston would be enough. 
(R. 28-29). She stated that she believed she had been 
harrassed by the actions of her supervisor in criticizing her 
at strategic times and preventing her from doing needed things. 
She concluded by saying that she did not appeal this harrass-
ment since her supervisor was a powerful person and she did 
not feel she would have any chance in swaying judgments. 
(R. 29). 
On September 16, 1981 a decision was rendered by the 
appeal referee conclu4ing that the claimant Carol Petersen 
had voluntarily left work without good cause. Basically, 
the referee found that the claimant's work had not been fullv 
"" 
accepted and that she had been reprimanded by her supervisor 
for the areas of deficiency but that her job was not in 
jeopardy and the employer did not plan to discharge her. He 
found that the claimant did not have any prospects for more 
suitable work at the time she left St. Benedict's Hospital. 
The referee concluded that since Petersen made no attempt to 
extend an additional month after signing the notice of 
-10-
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resignat~on that she voluntarily agreed to the June 30, 
1981 date. He concluded-by stating: 
There is evidence that the claimant had 
less than a fully satisfactory relationship 
with her supervisor. The poor relationship 
appears to have been due to the claimant's 
rejection of instructions given to her by her 
supervisor in the normal course of supervisor/ 
subordinate interactions, and not to any willful 
attempt by the supervisor to harrass the claimant. 
Personnel policy of the hospital as contained 
in written information made available to the 
claimant provides an avenue for relief to 
employees who feel they have been wrongfully 
or unfairly treated. The claimant was aware of 
the remedies available to her, yet she chose 
not to pursue them. The appeals referee con-
cludes that·the situation was not so compelling 
as to constitute good cause for leaving work 
within the meaning of the Utah Employment 
Security Act. (R. 15-16). 
On September 24, 1981 Petersen wrote a letter to the 
appeals referee responding to the decision. (R. 12-14). 
A rebuttal to Mrs. Petersen's letter was filed by Mr. 
Featherston on October 2, 1981. (R. 9-10). An appeal was 
docketed with the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission 
and a decision was rendered by the Board on November 10, 1981. 
The decision of the appeals referee was reversed. The Board 
gave the following explanation for the reversal. 
In reversing the decision of the Appeal 
Referee the Board of Review notes the claimant's 
testimony that on several occasions she was 
criticized by her supervisor just before con-
ducting training sessions and that she was denied 
a transfer to another assignment for which she 
was experienced solely because the supervisor 
of the new unit would have been a friend of the 
-11-
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claimant's. The claimant's testimony regarding 
these circumstnaces was undisputed by the 
employer's representative. Although such circum-
stances are not compelling and therefore do not 
constitute good cause, they are sufficiently 
mitigating as to give reason to the claimant's 
decision to leave work. The record indicates 
that the claimant immediately commenced a search 
for work upon leaving her employment. Therefore, 
a denial of benefits in the instant case would 
be contrary to equity and good conscience. (R. 6). 
(Emphasis added) . 
It is from this decision that the present petition for 
writ of review is taken. (R. 2). 
ARGUMENT 
THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW WAS ERRONEOUS 
IN THAT IT INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE UNEMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY ACT IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO LAW. 
Plaintiff acknowledges that in order to overturn the 
decision of the Board of Review it must show that such 
decision was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or as a 
matter of law_ the determination was wrong. Continental Oil 
Co. v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 568 P.2d 
727 (Utah 1977). However, even with this difficult burden 
Plaintiff believes that in the instant case the Board of 
Review clearly erred as a matter of law and therefore must 
be reversed. 
The statute upon which compensation was originally denied 
is found in Section 35-4-S(a) in the 1981 pocket supplement 
to the Utah Code. This section has been amended several 
times with the last amendment being in 1979. 
-12-
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Prior to the 1979 amendment the statute provided that 
an individual would be ineligible for benefits if the 
claimant left work voluntarily without good cause. Thus, 
the previous standard of "good cause 11 had been established 
for many years and this Court defined such requirement in 
Denby v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, 567 
P.2d 626 (Utah 1977). 
In the Denby case this Court quoted from various authorities 
in elaborating the "good cause" requirement of the statute. This 
Court stated the following: 
What is "good cause" must reflect the under-
lying purpose of the act to relieve against the 
distress of involuntary unemployment. The seeming 
paradox of allowing benefits to an individual whose 
unemployment is of his own volition disappears when 
the context of the words is viewed in that light. 
The Legislature contemplated that when an individual 
voluntarily leaves a job under the pressure of cir-
cumstances which may reasonably be viewed as having 
compelled him to do so, the termination of his 
employment is involuntary for purposes of the Act. 
In statutory contemplation he cannot then reasonably 
be judged as free to stay at the job. Id. at 630. 
This Court further elaborated the procedure for establishing 
"good cause" and its definition by stating the following: 
The initial determination of "good cause" 
for vountarily leaving employment, is a mixed 
question of law and fact for the administrative 
agency. A claimant has the burden of showing 
good cause for leaving, when he voluntarily 
terminates suitable employment. "Good cause" 
has been defined as "such cause as would similarly 
affect persons of reasonable and normal sensitivity, 
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and is limited to those instances where the unemploy-
ment is caused by external pressures so compelling 
that a reasonably prudent person, exercising 
ordinary common sense and prudence, would be 
justified in quitting under similar circumstances. 
Id. at 630. 
The "good cause" standard is adopted throughout the 
country to determine whether voluntary termination justifies 
unemployment compensation. Cases similar to the instant one 
have held that "good cause" is not established when a super-
intendent criticizes a worker for substandard work, Boodry 
v. Eddy Bakeries Co., 397 P.2d 256 (Idaho 1964), and when 
an employee fails to follow grievance procedures as to 
disputes in the conditions of employment. Beaman v. Aynes, 
393 P.2d 152 (Ariz. 1964). 
The Board of Review in this case recognized that the 
claim by Carol Petersen of harrassment by her supervisor was 
not substantiated by the facts and that the evidence showed 
she was being reprimanded for substandard perfor2ance. The 
Board also recognized that her failure to be t~ansferred to 
another unit upon request did not constitute good cause.· 
Specifically, the Board stated that such "circumsntaces are 
not compelling and therefore do not constitute good cause." 
(R. 6). 
The error in the Board's decision results from the 
language contained in the 1979 amendment to Section 35-4-S(a). 
-14-
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The present statute still retains the original "good cause" 
language for compensation but then states the following 
additional caveat: 
Provided, that no claimant shall be ineligible 
for benefits if the claimant leaves work under 
circumstances of such a nature that it would be 
contrary to equity and good conscience to impose 
a disqualification. 
The Commission shall in cooperation with the 
employer consider for the purposes of this Act, 
the reasonableness of the claimant's actions, 
and the extent to which the actions evidence a 
genuine continuing attachment to the labor market 
in reaching a determination of whether the ineligi-
bility of a claimant is contrary to equity and 
good conscience .. 
The 1979 amendment has created an apparent inconsistency 
in the application of this section. The first portion of 
the statute requires a "good cause" determination if benefits 
are to be received. The added ·portion, however, seemingly 
negates this requirement by applying a standard of "equity 
and good conscience." 
Plaintiff has been unable to find any similar wording 
of a statute in the United States in which "equity and good 
conscience" applies to qualifications of unemployment benefits. 
The term, however, is frequently used in statutes in which 
over-payment of claims has occurred and the recipient claimant 
is requested to pay back the previous wrongful payments. 
These decisions indicate that the term "equity and good 
conscience" is "an elastic expression" of "unusual generality" 
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which "anticipates that the trier of fact, instead of 
attempting to channelize his decision within rigid and 
specific rules, will draw upon precepts of justice and 
morality as the basis for his ruling." See City of Lead-
ville v. Sewer Co., 107 P. 801 (Colo. 1909); Gilles v. Dept. 
of Human Resources Development, 521 P.2d 110 (Cal. 1974). 
The Gilles decision is the leading authority on 
describing the terms "equity and good conscience." This 
decision noted that the term had its probable source from 
the 1974 Social Security Act. The Act defined these terms 
as follows: 
Against "equity and good conscience" means 
that adjustment or recovery of an incorrect 
payment . . . will be considered inequitable if 
an individual, because of a notice that such 
payment would be made or by reason of the 
incorrect payment, relinquished a valuable 
right .. ·. or changed his position for the 
WO rs e . . . . 2 0 c . F • R • 4 0 4 . s 0 9 ( 19 7 9 ) . 
The California Supreme Court noted that the term "equity 
and good conscience" is an extremely general term with vir-
tually no boundary or limitation except in the mind of the 
chancelor. The court noted that Black's Law Dictionary 
states the following: 
The term "equity" in its broadest and most 
general signification . . denotes the spirit and 
habit of fairness, justice, and right dealing 
which would regulate the intercourse of men with 
men. [In] this sense its obligation is 
ethical rather than jural, and its discussion 
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belongs to the sphere of morals~ It is grounded 
in the precepts of the conscience, not in any 
sanction of positive law. In a restricted sense, 
the word denotes equal and impartial justice . .; 
justice, that is, as ascertained by natural reason 
or ethical insight, but independent of the for-
mulated body of law. 521 P.2d at 116, fn. 10. 
The court noted that "conscience" is defined in similar 
generality and that the term "ignores reason, defies argu-
ment, and is unaccountable and irresponsible to all human 
tests and standards; it is a law unto itself, and its scruples, 
and its teachings are not amenable to human tribunals, but 
rests alone with its possessor and his God." Id. See also, 
Duenas-Rodriguez v. The Industrial Commission, 606 P.2d 437 
(Colao 1980); Gettinger v. Celebrezze, ·218 F .. Supp. 161 
(D .. N.Y .. 1963) .. 
Thus, the Board of Review conceded that the claimant had 
fa).led to establish "good cause 11 for terminating her employ-
ment but determined under the "equity and good conscience" 
standard the criticism by her supervisor and the failure to 
be transferred to another department were "sufficiently mitigati 
to give reason to the claimant's decision to leave work." 
(R. 6). 
The interpretation by the Board of Review of this statute 
should not stand. Under this interpretation even when good 
cause is not shown the vague, general, and unlimited standard 
of "equity and good conscience" is applicable.which, as stated 
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above, cont.ains no limitations or judicial standards for 
review. Thus, while a court could determine if "good cause" 
is present in a situation it cannot determine the "equity 
and good conscience" of the Commission in reviewing each 
case. 
The interpretation given by the Board of Review would 
make the "good cause" language in the statute meaningless. 
Obviously, there is no point in even determining "good cause" 
if the Commission has an unlimited ability to determine in 
equity and good conscience whether the circumstances justify 
a disqualification. This interpretation, therefore, makes 
the statute completely inconsistent by requiring a standard 
and defined definition at the beginning of the statute but 
overriding such definition by a broad and unlimited term at 
the end of the statute. 
It is common statutory construction that when possible 
a court must give every word, phrase, clause and sentence of 
a statute a consistent and reasonable meaning. Robinson v. 
Union Pacific Railway Co., 261 P. 9 (Utah 1921). If there 
is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of 
a provision it is appropriate to analyze the act in its 
entiretyr in light of its objective, and to harmonize its 
provisions in accordance with legislative intent and purpose. 
Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 608 P.2d 242 (Utah 1980). 
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Likewise, this Court has held on numerous occasions that the 
doctrine of ejusdem generis requires that specific provisions 
prevail over more general expressions when determining the 
meaning or application of a provision of an act. Id. 
Applying this doctrine to the instant case and statute 
results in the following analysis. The Legislature intended 
to further define the phrase "good cause" by the 1979 amend-
ment. It requested that the Commission in determining good 
cause shall "in cooperation with the employer consider for 
the purposes of this Act, the reasonableness of the claimant's 
actions, and the extent to which the actions evidence a 
genuine continuing attachment to the labor market." This 
interpretation is consistent with the Denby opinion of this 
Court in which this Court held that a claimant must expose 
himself unequivocally to the labor market in order to receive 
compensation and that good cause exists when a reasonably 
prudent person exercising ordinary common sense would be 
justified in quitting under similar circumstances. 
In other words, the statute as written places the same 
tests for "equity and good conscience" i.e., "the reasonable-
ness of claimant's actions, and the extent to which the 
actions evidence a genuine continuing attachment to the 
labor market" as does the definition of "good cause" as 
elaborated in the Denby decision. 
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While this statute is unartfully drawn the drafters 
could not have intended to apply two different standards 
to the same factual situation. If the term "good cause" 
is to have any meaning whatsoever then it must be read in 
conjunction with the "equity and good conscience" language 
as a standard in determining good cause. To view the two 
standards separately completely defeats any purpo?e in 
arriving at "good cause" since such a determination then 
becomes inunaterial to the normally accepted, broad, and 
unlimited definition of "equity and good conscience." 
In the instant case, the Board of Review should have 
determined whether defendant Carol Petersen acted in a 
reasonable manner and showed a genuine continuing attach-
ment to the labor market in determining whether "good cause" 
had been established. Had it done so in terms of the "good 
cause" standard it would have concluded that the claimant 
was not entitled to unemployment compensation. 
It would not be reasonable for a person to leave their 
employment merely because they have been criticized on 
several occasions by their supervisor regardless of when 
these occasions occurred. Likewise, it would not be reason-
able for a person to leave their employment when they are 
denied a transfer due to the employer's policy of preventing 
conflicts between best friends in a subordinate and superior 
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position. The Board would have concluded that these factors 
were not sufficient to justify the voluntary termination 
under the "good cause" mandate. 
For this reason, the decision of the Board of Review 
as it is now written should not prevail. The decision must 
be reversed as a matter of law based upon the evidence 
existing in the record or, in the alternative, the matter 
should be remanded to the Board of Review so that it can 
apply the appropriate standard. 
CONCLUSION 
The present appeal involves the first time this Court 
has dealt with the 1979 amendment to Section 33-4-S(a), 
U.C.A. It is important that the seemingly inconsistent 
language contained in this subsection be reconciled by 
this Court in order to establish a future standard for review 
in the numerous cases which arise regarding voluntary ter-
mination of employment. 
The Legislature could not have intended to give the 
Board of Review two standards to apply in these types of 
cases. While the "good cause" standard uses establisheq 
criteria and guidelines the other "equity and good conscience" 
standard can have no judicially reviewable criteria. Thus, 
it must be assumed that the Legislature intended on merely 
further defining "good cause" rather than abolishing it. 
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The problem simply reduces itself to the question of 
whether a person has left work voluntarily for "good cause" 
or not. If the person has a reasonable basis for having 
left work and the actions show a genuine continuing attach-
ment to the labor market then good cause is present. If, 
on the other hand, the actions of the claimant are unreason-
able or do not reflect a continuing attachment to the labor 
market, then good cause has not been shown. The use of the 
"equity and good conscience" language cannot be utilized to 
circumvent the "good cause" requirement. 
For these reasons Plaintiff respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the determination made by the Board of 
Review and hold as a matter of law that the evidence does 
not justify defendant Carol Petersen's claim for unemployment 
compensation. In the alternative, this matter should be 
remanded to the Board of Review for application of the correct 
legal standard. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~q.~ 
Glenn J. Mecham 
~-JJ. Craig~ Cook 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
St. Benedict's Hospital 
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